Impact of Own Brand Product Introduction on Optimal Pricing Models for Platform and Incumbent Sellers
研究电商平台引入自有品牌产品对现有卖家的影响，发现禁止平台既做市场又参与市场的政策反而可能损害卖家利益。
Sales on the e-commerce platform in the United States have experienced explosive growth and are projected to surpass $740 billion in 2023. The expansion of the platform’s traditional role as a reseller into an online marketplace and the introduction of its own brand products have stoked a huge fear among the incumbent sellers. The platform’s unfair anti-competitive practice further aggravates the situation. Consequently, politicians and regulators have proposed prohibiting platforms from introducing own brand products to protect the incumbent sellers. This study addresses two questions of critical interest to the policymakers and the incumbent sellers. First, how does the platform’s introducing its own brand product affect the incumbent sellers? Second, how effective is the proposed policy in terms of protecting the incumbent sellers? We examine the impact of the platform’s own brand introduction on the incumbent sellers under two prevailing sell-on and sell-to pricing contracts. We find that the proposed legislation “that prohibits platforms from both offering a marketplace for commerce and participating in that marketplace” does not have the desired outcome of helping the incumbent sellers. Instead, it forces the platform to adopt only the sell-to contract with its own brand introduction which hurts the sellers under most market conditions.