Does Venture Capital Backing Improve Disclosure Controls and Procedures? Evidence from Management’s Post-IPO Disclosures
研究发现，有风险投资支持的新上市公司在萨班斯-奥克斯利法案第302条下的内部控制缺陷更少，且其披露信息更可能预示后续财务报表重述，表明披露控制与程序更强。
Firm managers make ethical decisions regarding the form and quality of disclosure. Disclosure can have long-term implications for performance, earnings manipulation, and even fraud. We investigate the impact of venture capital (VC) backing on the quality and informativeness of disclosure controls and procedures for newly public companies. We find that these controls and procedures are stronger, as evidenced by fewer material weaknesses in internal control under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, when companies are VC-backed. Moreover, these disclosures are informative and are more likely to be followed by subsequent financial statement restatements than are disclosures made by non-VC-backed IPO companies.