Optimal financing and investment strategies under asymmetric information on liquidation value
利用实物期权模型，研究事后清算时的信息不对称如何影响企业事前融资（资本结构）和投资决策，发现信息不对称会延迟投资并减少债务发行，且高不对称时企业无法采用风险债务与权益的混合融资。
This study develops the real options model to explore how asymmetric information at the time of liquidation ex-post affects a firm’s financing (capital structure) and investment decisions ex-ante. Accordingly, it is found that asymmetric information at the time of liquidation delays investment and reduces the amount of debt issuance. When the degree of asymmetric information is high, the firm cannot take a mixed financing consisting of risky debt and equity. The firm with collateral takes a mixed financing consisting of risk-free debt and equity, whose debt issuance amount equals the collateral value, whereas the firm without collateral takes all-equity financing. This result contrasts with that under symmetric information, where the firm always issues a mix of risky debt and equity. Moreover, when the degree of asymmetric information is substantial, an increase in cash inflow volatility decreases debt issuance. This result also contrasts with that under symmetric information, where an increase in volatility increases debt issuance.