Migration and Imitation
构建了一个南北贸易模型，比较了南方知识产权保护与北方吸引南方人才的移民政策对创新和模仿的影响，发现移民政策能提升全球收入，而加强知识产权保护则不一定。
This paper develops a North–South trade model with heterogeneous labour and horizontally differentiated products, and compares the implications of two policies: Southern intellectual property rights (IPR) and Northern immigration policy, with the latter aiming to attract Southern talent as a means of pre‐empting imitation. Individuals self‐select into becoming entrepreneurs and innovate (imitate) in the North (South). The likelihood of imitation depends on product quality, imitator's talent and IPR strength. Several interrelated channels of competition are identified. Allowing high‐talent migration when IPR protection in the South is weak shifts imitation to low‐quality products and innovation to high‐quality products. The outcome is in stark contrast to the policy of strengthening Southern IPR, which limits low‐talent imitation in the South and encourages low‐quality innovation in the North. Migration also increases the income of low‐talent entrepreneurs, as well as the average quality of products imitated by high‐talent entrepreneurs in the South. Global income rises with migration, but is not guaranteed to rise with stronger Southern IPR.