When does time enhance family firm performance? Examining family generation in control and family control dispersion through a mixed-gamble logic
研究家族企业控制权在不同世代间传递时，时间如何影响绩效：早期世代保护现有社会情感财富导致绩效下降，后期世代追求财务收益使绩效上升，且家族控制分散度会调节这一效应。
We investigate the differential effect of time in terms of generation in control of the firm's management on family firm performance to address the call in the literature for a more nuanced treatment of family firms and their performance differences. By drawing on the mixed-gamble logic of the behavioral agency model, our work suggests that the family's socio-emotional wealth (SEW) varies across generations, resulting in complex performance relationships. We theorize and empirically find that earlier-generation family firms protect current SEW and perform increasingly worse while later-generation firms maximize prospective financial wealth and perform increasingly better. Additionally, we argue that high family control dispersion mitigates the negative effect on performance of earlier generations in control and increases the positive effect of later generations in control. Important theoretical and practical contributions emerge from this study.