Insider Horizon and Disclosure Policies
研究了内部人时间视野长短如何影响公司披露政策，发现短视野内部人更倾向于增加披露以降低信息不对称，并用新上市公司和CEO临近退休的公司数据验证了该结论。
ABSTRACT We investigate the relationship between insider horizon and disclosure policy. First, we develop and analyze a rational expectations model assuming insiders are able to commit to a disclosure policy. Insiders with a short horizon prefer more disclosure and are willing to bear costs of disclosure to reduce information asymmetries among capital market participants. We then empirically test our predictions in the setting of newly public firms and firms where the CEO is approaching retirement. We find that firms with insiders that have a shorter horizon disclose more and experience lower information asymmetry. Our study contributes to the understanding of firms’ disclosure choices by suggesting that the horizon of insiders shapes a firm’s disclosure policy. JEL Classifications: G14; G32; D83.