DECIDING WHEN TO DECIDE: COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION AND OBSTRUCTION
研究了委员会中审议规则如何影响集体学习和决策，区分了最终投票与终止辩论的投票，发现审议规则可能导致帕累托低效结果并影响权力分配。
Abstract We study the impact of deliberation rules on collective learning and decision making in committees. In contrast to much of the existing literature, this article makes a distinction between the final votes over policy proposals and the cloture votes that bring them about. We show how deliberation rules can cause Pareto‐inefficient outcomes and failures to bring good proposals to a final vote, and how they affect the distribution of power among committee members in the deliberative process. We further show that deliberation rules are dynamically stable, even when they generate Pareto‐inefficient outcomes.