How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment
通过实验室实验，研究不同反垄断制度（罚款企业或起诉经理人）对经理人劳动合同、卡特尔形成和价格合谋的影响，发现起诉经理人制度更能减少合谋，而高激励合同常被股东选择且带有合谋意图。
We explore the impacts of different antitrust regimes on managers’ labor contracts, when shareholders are intent on their managers engaging in price fixing activities. We compare legal regimes that fine firms to regimes that prosecute managers. We build a theoretical model, which we take to the laboratory. We observe contract choices of shareholders for a given legal regime, as well as the probability of managers forming explicit cartels and coordinating on prices in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly, taking contract and legal regime as given. Our results suggest that there is less collusion when the legal regime prosecutes managers. High-powered contracts do not incentivize cartel formation or price coordination effectively, irrespective of legal regime. Nevertheless, high-powered contracts were most frequently chosen by shareholders, often with collusive intents.