Effects of monetary policy credibility and the open economy trilemma on monetary policy efficiency
基于28个发展中国家的数据，研究发现货币政策可信度能提升效率，而金融开放和汇率稳定会降低效率，但国际储备积累可缓解这些影响。
Abstract This study investigates the effects of monetary policy credibility and the open economy trilemma on monetary policy efficiency in developing countries. Based on a sample of 28 developing countries, the findings reveal that monetary policy credibility increases monetary policy efficiency. The results also show that central banks in developing countries have more efficient monetary policies when they choose a policy arrangement contrary to the ‘middle‐ground convergence’; but, to the extent they accumulate international reserves, it allows them to move to a middle‐ground strategy. Regarding the trilemma, the estimates suggest when monetary policy is independent, monetary policy is more efficient. Furthermore, when financial openness and exchange rate stability are deepened, central banks become less efficient in conducting monetary policy. However, when countries hold higher levels of international reserves, the positive effect of monetary autonomy on monetary policy efficiency decreases and the negative effect of financial liberalisation on monetary policy efficiency decreases.