Pareto-Improving Segmentation of Multiproduct Markets
研究多产品垄断卖家如何通过市场分割，使所有消费者和卖家都受益，并证明在利润最大化导致低效时，分割成两个细分市场能提高部分消费者和卖家的剩余。
We investigate whether a market served by a multiproduct monopolistic seller can be segmented in a way that benefits all consumers and the seller. The seller can offer a different product menu in each market segment, combining second- and third-degree price discrimination. We show that markets for which profit maximization leads to inefficiency can, generically, be segmented into two market segments in a way that increases the surplus of all consumers weakly and of some consumers and the seller strictly. Our constructive proof is based on deriving implications of binding incentive compatibility constraints when profit maximization implies inefficiency.