Implementing optimal outcomes through sequential auctions
研究了序贯拍卖作为销售多种异质物品给单位需求买家的最优机制，发现按买家价值变异递减顺序排列物品时，任何静态标准拍卖的组合都能实现完全效率和约束最优收益。
Abstract We study sequential auctions as optimal mechanisms for selling multiple heterogeneous items to unit‐demand buyers. We find that as long as the items can be ordered in decreasing variation of the buyers' values, any combination of static standard auctions in this sequence achieves full efficiency and the constrained optimal revenue, subject to (BIC), (IIR), and the all‐sold constraint. In addition, with increasing threshold types and optimal static reserve prices, any l ‐th price auctions in the same sequence can achieve the optimal revenue subject to (BIC) and (IIR). Our results have implications for practical auction design, such as sponsored search auctions.