Partial Default
研究发现国家经常发生部分违约且强度不同，导致部分违约和债务呈驼峰形模式；违约给债权人带来损失但债务不减，因为违约债务累积且借款持续。论文提出了部分违约理论，并分析了同等权益、不稀释条款和债务减免政策的福利影响。
We document that countries partially default often and with varying intensity, resulting in lengthy episodes and hump-shaped patterns for partial default and debt. Default episodes lead to haircuts for lenders but not to reductions in debt, because the defaulted debt accumulates and borrowing continues. We present a theory of partial default rationalizing these patterns and the heterogeneity of partial default, and partial default’s comovements with spreads, debt, and output that are absent in standard sovereign default theory. We include policy counterfactuals in the form of pari passu and no-dilution clauses and debt-relief policies, and their welfare implications.