Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
研究了共同所有权如何通过影响高管激励进而改变产品市场结果，发现共同所有权越高的企业，其高管激励对业绩的敏感度越低，这会导致价格、产出和市场份额的差异。
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intraindustry and intrafirm cross-market variation in prices, output, markups, and market shares that is consistent with empirical evidence. The organizational structure of multiproduct firms and the passivity of common owners determine whether higher prices under common ownership result from higher costs or from higher markups. Using panel regressions and a difference-in-differences design, we document that managerial incentives are less performance sensitive in firms with more common ownership.