Analysis of online rebates and commission formats in a retailer‐Stackelberg supply chain with cashback website
研究了电商平台通过返现网站提供在线返利时，两种佣金模式（分成与固定）对定价、批发价及供应链各方利润的影响，发现返利可能抬高零售价、损害制造商，但低端消费者和制造商在低估值时更受益于分成佣金。
Abstract Motivated by the fact that many e‐tailers offer online rebates through cashback websites to attract more consumers, and wield channel leadership, we construct a retailer‐Stackelberg supply chain comprised of one e‐tailer, one manufacturer, and one cashback website. Cashback websites have two commission formats: sharing and fixed. We first explore the online rebate strategy of the e‐tailer (under the two commission formats); and then study the e‐tailer's commission format selection strategy when offering rebates. Our analysis reveals that: (i) the product valuation and fraction of low‐end consumers play key roles in shaping the e‐tailer's online rebate and commission format selection strategies; (ii) the e‐tailer's rebates increase the wholesale price under sharing commission, but decrease it under fixed commission; (iii) the e‐tailer's rebates may be a trap for consumers because they may pay a higher retail price after rebates; (iv) under both commissions, the e‐tailer's rebates hurt the manufacturer, but could enhance supply chain performance; and (v) when offering rebates, low‐end consumers and the manufacturer are better off under sharing commission if its product valuation is sufficiently low, while high‐end consumers are better off under fixed commission. Additionally, the e‐tailer has a stronger incentive to provide rebates when the manufacturer acts as the leader; temporary rebate promotion may lead to a triple win situation for the manufacturer, e‐tailer, and consumers.