Do Board Gender Quotas Generate Horizontal Spillovers?
利用2006-2018年意大利非上市银行面板数据，研究发现2012年针对上市公司的女性董事会配额法显著提高了非上市银行董事会中女性的比例和存在概率，表明该法律通过改变社会规范产生了横向溢出效应。
Abstract Using a panel of unlisted Italian banks over the period 2006–2018, we examine the extent to which a law that mandatorily introduced female quotas in the boards of Italian listed companies in 2012 had spillover effects on the boards of unlisted banks, which were not required to comply with the quota. Our results show that both the probability of having at least one woman on the board and the proportion of women on the boards of unlisted banks have been rising significantly after the passing of the law. These findings, which are robust to estimating different specifications and to using different estimation techniques, suggest that the quota law contributed to generating a fairer attitude towards women and, more in general, a change in social norms on gender equality. This may have, in turn, generated isomorphic pressures on unlisted banks, inducing them to mimic the board composition of their listed counterparts.