Is There a Trade-off Between Protecting Investors and Promoting Entrepreneurial Activity? Evidence from Angel Financing
利用2011年美国SEC对合格投资者定义的监管变化，研究发现受影响更大的城市天使融资、创业活动、创新产出、就业和销售额显著下降，且保护成本超过收益。
Abstract This article studies how changes in investor protection regulations affect local entrepreneurial activity, relying on the heterogeneous impact of a 2011 SEC regulation change on the definition of accredited investors across U.S. cities. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I show that cities more affected by the regulation change experienced a significantly larger decrease in local angel financing, entrepreneurial activity, innovation output, employment, and sales. I find that small business loans and second-lien mortgages became entrepreneurs’ partial substitutes for angel investment. My cost-benefit analysis suggests that the costs of protecting angel investors through the 2011 regulation change outweigh its benefits.