Cost of monitoring and risk taking in the money market funds industry
利用2015年美国货币市场基金改革作为准自然实验，研究发现取消信用评级信息要求后，基金增加了对二级评级证券的配置，且该效应由受监控的零售基金驱动，同时二级商业票据的发行利差下降。
Increasing the cost associated with gathering information can hamper the monitoring activity of the market even when information remains public. Using the 2015 US money market funds (MMFs) reform as a quasi-natural experiment, I find a positive effect of removing information requirements over credit ratings on the allocation by MMFs toward securities rated as second tier. The effect is driven by monitored MMFs catering to retail investors and by monitored MMFs that do not voluntarily report credit ratings after the reform. The verfied increase in the relative demand by MMFs for second tier securities is associated with a decrease in the spread paid at issuance by second tier commercial paper.