How do central banks make decisions?
研究加拿大银行管理委员会在两种决策协议下的行为，发现数据支持一种主席适度包容的投票模型，该模型内生产生共识结果，且决策摩擦对货币政策制定有重要影响。
Abstract This paper studies decision making by the governing council of the Bank of Canada under two alternative protocols. The protocols are: (i) the median model and (ii) the inclusive‐voting model due to Riboni and Ruge‐Murcia (2020), where the chair and the median share proposal power. Results show that the data favour a version of the inclusive‐voting model where the chair of the committee is moderately inclusive and which endogenously generates the consensus outcome in Riboni and Ruge‐Murcia (2010). Decision‐making frictions are empirically important in the formulation of monetary policy, and the selected policy is the outcome of a compromise between committee members.