Conflicts of interest and agent heterogeneity in buyer brokerage
研究固定百分比佣金制下买方经纪人的激励问题，发现无约束合同降低了利益冲突，且经纪人预测准确性和客户容忍度影响约束力，加拿大交易数据支持模型预测。
Abstract This article investigates the incentives of agents working with buyers (buying agents) under the fixed percentage commission system and the implications on housing market outcomes. Our model shows that the absence of a binding contract creates a risk of losing clients for buying agents, which helps mitigate the conflict of interest between buying agents and their clients. Both the buying agent's prediction accuracy regarding their client's reservation prices and the level of tolerance given by the buyer to the buying agent affect the binding force. Results from simulations and empirical analyses using house transactions in Canada support our model predictions.