Incentives to Improve Government Agricultural Extension Agent Performance: A Randomized Controlled Trial in Bangladesh
通过孟加拉国40个县级农业办公室的随机对照试验，发现金钱奖励和上级认可两种激励方式均能显著提升农业推广人员绩效，效果相当。
This study provides empirical evidence on how financial and nonfinancial incentives improve service delivery of government agricultural extension agents. A randomized controlled trial was conducted in 40 subdistrict agriculture offices in Bangladesh, with 807 agricultural extension officers, randomly allocated into five groups (one control and four treatment). The financial incentive was a one-time monetary reward, while the nonfinancial incentive was recognition by the district director. In the nonfinancial incentive treatment, we added another treatment in which the two worst performers, instead of best, are selected for inspection. In the financial incentive, we created another treatment where the best performer is selected based on performance level. We find that financial and nonfinancial incentives have positive effects of equal magnitude, about 1 standard deviation of total performance index on average. Giving a disadvantage to better performers does not decrease effort by better performers.