CEO Marital Status and Insider Trading
研究发现已婚CEO的内幕交易回报低于未婚CEO，且已婚CEO更少从事机会主义交易，尤其在治理弱和信息不对称高的公司中更明显。
Abstract We investigate the association between chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) marital status and their tendency to profit from insider trading. We argue that marriage can constrain CEOs’ opportunistic behaviour, which could increase litigation risk, and show that married CEOs earn lower insider trading returns compared to unmarried CEOs. Insider trades can be identified as either routine or opportunistic. We also find that married CEOs are less likely to engage in opportunistic trades, and they earn lower insider trading returns in firms with weaker corporate governance and higher information asymmetry. Our empirical results remain robust after accounting for several endogeneity tests.