Communicating through Defaults
通过两个实验室实验和一个代表性调查，研究信息不对称和策略激励如何影响默认选项的效果，发现默认选项在利益一致时更具信息性，且决策者更倾向于遵循默认选项而非同等信息的建议。
Abstract We report the results of two laboratory experiments and a representative survey that investigate how default effects are shaped by information asymmetries and strategic incentives. We document that defaults are more informative when the interests of default setters and decision makers are more closely aligned. Decision makers’ propensity to accept defaults depends, both, on the alignment of interests and the quality of their information. In a second experiment, we demonstrate that decision makers are more likely to follow defaults than to accept (equally informative) advice. Complementary evidence from a representative survey underlines that consumers commonly perceive defaults as being set strategically.