Quadrophobia: Strategic Rounding of EPS Data
研究发现管理者为抬高每股收益而刻意避免小数点后第一位出现数字4，这种“四恐惧症”可作为激进财务报告的指标，能预测未来财务重述、监管诉讼和集体诉讼，且在高管薪酬与股价挂钩或面临债务违约风险时更明显。
Abstract Managers’ incentives to round up reported earnings per share (EPS) cause an underrepresentation of the number 4 in the first post-decimal digit of EPS, or “quadrophobia.” We develop a novel measure of aggressive financial reporting practices based on a firm’s history of quadrophobia. Quadrophobia is pervasive, persistent, and successfully predicts future restatements, Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions, and class action litigation. It is more pronounced when executive compensation is more closely tied to the stock price and when the firm anticipates violating debt covenants. Quadrophobia is especially strong when rounding-up EPS allows firms to meet analyst expectations, and investors seem not to see through this behavior.