The joint influence of Sarbanes‐Oxley and FAS123R on financial misreporting
研究了萨班斯-奥克斯利法案(SOX)和FAS 123R如何共同影响财务错报，发现SOX持续减少了欺诈重述和AAER，而FAS 123R对股权激励驱动的错报的抑制效果只是暂时的。
Abstract Prior research reports that a manager's equity risk‐taking incentive (vega) is positively associated with financial misreporting. FAS 123R led to a significant decrease in vega while SOX increased the cost of financial misreporting. Consistent with the original intent of the legislation, we find that SOX contributed to significant decreases in both fraud restatements and AAERs. Importantly, our results suggest that the SOX‐induced decreases in fraud restatements and AAERs have endured to more recent years. On the other hand, while we find evidence that equity‐incentive‐motivated financial misreporting ceased to exist in the immediate years after FAS 123R, we also find that this was only temporary. In particular, we find strong evidence of a significantly positive association between vega and accrual misreporting in more recent years.