CEO mobility and corporate payouts
利用美国州法院对不可避免披露原则的采纳作为CEO流动性变化的外生冲击，发现流动性受限的CEO会提高现金分红以巩固职位，尤其在高能力CEO和早期职业CEO中更显著。
Abstract We examine how chief executive officer (CEO) mobility affects corporate payouts. We exploit US state courts’ staggered adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) to obtain exogenous variation in mobility. We report several findings. First, we find that firms in IDD‐adopting states increase dividend payouts, whereas the effect of IDD on share repurchases is insignificant relative to firms not in IDD‐adopting states. Second, the increase in dividends is concentrated on firms run by CEOs having high ability. Third, CEOs increasing dividends are less likely to be forced to leave their jobs. Fourth, the increase in dividends is concentrated on firms run by early‐career CEOs rather than retiring CEOs. Last, CEOs increasing dividends receive more favorable shareholders’ say on pay votes for higher pay. Our evidence supports the notion that restricted mobility induces CEOs to choose a dividend policy that enhances their positions with their shareholders.