Dysfunction and Pathology in Brussels: The European Commission and the Politics of Debt Restructuring
研究了2011年欧盟委员会在希腊债务重组中反对私人部门参与，尽管成员国和投资者支持，这一立场加剧了金融不稳定，损害了其危机管理目标。基于10次精英访谈，将行为归因于委员会在金融危机中历史形成的亲一体化文化。
Abstract The European Union (EU) studies literature has not engaged much with instances in which the European Commission exhibited dysfunctional and pathological behaviour. The paper employs a least likely case to suggest that the Commission might adopt such behaviour even under adverse circumstances. It examines the Commission's public opposition to a private sector involvement scheme for Greece in 2011, despite member states and investors favouring such an option. This stance exacerbated financial instability, proving detrimental for the Commission's stated crisis‐management goals. By using qualitative material, including 10 elite interviews, the paper attributes this behaviour to the Commission's pro‐integration culture as historically interpreted in the context of financial crises. This led the Commission to universalise inefficient policies whilst being insulated from external feedback. The study offers insights on when the Commission adopts dysfunctional behaviour whilst providing a novel angle on its role in EU integration.