How to fight corruption: Carrots and sticks
建立了一个不完全信息下的腐败模型，分析惩罚受贿官员与奖励举报公民的组合政策，发现单独使用惩罚或奖励均无法杜绝腐败，但两者恰当结合可完全消除腐败，且官僚体系越庞大腐败越难治理。
Abstract I present a model of corruption with incomplete information where the bureaucrat may request a bribe from the citizen for providing a service. I show that corruption is detrimental to social welfare and consider a new policy to prevent it. I propose punishing bureaucrats who take bribes and rewarding citizens who report such cases. Neither punishment nor rewards can prevent corruption alone. However, the proper combination of punishment and rewards completely prevents corruption. I also show that higher bureaucracy increases corruption in equilibrium and makes it harder to combat it.