Intergenerational Transmission of Preferences and the Operativeness of Bequest Motive
研究了在消费外部性存在时，父母通过储蓄行为影响子女对相对消费地位的关注，分析代际利他主义对遗产动机和资本积累的影响，发现即使遗产动机有效，跨期配置也非最优。
Abstract We analyze the implications of dynastic altruism in an overlapping generations (OLG) model with consumption externalities and where parents influence their children's concern for relative standing in consumption through their saving behavior. The degree of altruism for which individuals leave bequests can be both larger or smaller than in an economy without intergenerational transmission of preferences. The optimal allocation exhibits a stationary capital stock larger than the one corresponding to the economy without transmission of preferences. Even when the bequest motive is operative, the intertemporal allocation is suboptimal. We characterize the optimal policy under the two regimes of the bequest motive.