Board gender diversity and the cost of equity: What difference does gender quota legislation make?
研究法国公司样本发现，女性董事比例与股权成本负相关，尤其在至少四位女性董事的临界质量下，且这一关系在Copé–Zimmermann性别配额法实施后更为显著。
Abstract This study examines the relationship between women directors and the cost of equity (COE). Investigating the French firm's sample, we find a significant negative effect of women directors on the COE. Our results also document that the effect of women directors on reducing the COE is significant for firms that have a critical mass of at least four women directors. Using the difference‐in‐difference (DID) and propensity score matching (PSM) approach, we find that the relationship between female directors and lower equity costs is significant for the period following the Copé–Zimmermann gender quota law. The results show that women directors' presence on corporate boards is also supported by economic reasons. The study provides implications in relation to the Copé–Zimmermann law in France.