Watch What They Do, Not What They Say: Estimating Regulatory Costs from Revealed Preferences
利用银行资产规模在监管阈值附近分布扭曲的现象，构建结构模型估算监管成本，并以美国数据估算《多德-弗兰克法案》的实际成本，发现远低于银行自报值。
Abstract We show that distortion in the size distribution of banks around regulatory thresholds can be used to identify costs of bank regulation. We build a structural model in which banks can strategically bunch their assets below regulatory thresholds to avoid regulations. The resultant distortion in the size distribution of banks reveals the magnitude of regulatory costs. Using U.S. bank data, we estimate the regulatory costs imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act. Although the estimated regulatory costs are substantial, they are significantly lower than banks’ self-reported estimates. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.