Disclosure of Disaggregated Information in the Presence of Reputational Concerns
研究声誉关注的创业者如何权衡项目市场价格与自身能力评价，决定是否披露项目未来业绩的分拆信息，发现信号质量和声誉关注程度共同影响披露策略。
This study examines a reputation-concerned entrepreneur’s incentives to provide disaggregated information about a project’s future performance when the entrepreneur seeks to increase both the market price of the project and the market assessment of the entrepreneur’s ability as a project manager. Two factors determine equilibrium: (i) the informational quality of the signal related to the entrepreneur’s ability and (ii) the magnitude of reputational concerns. If the former is relatively low, the entrepreneur with moderate reputational concerns is more likely to provide disaggregated information when the signal about the project’s overall performance is intermediate than when it is sufficiently good or bad. Also, given any value of the signal about the overall performance, this entrepreneur withholds disaggregated information when the signal about the entrepreneur’s ability is intermediate rather than sufficiently good or bad. The comparative static results provide novel empirical predictions about disclosure of aggregate versus disaggregated information. This paper was accepted by Eric So, accounting.