Multiple Large Shareholders and Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from China
研究中国上市公司多个大股东对财务报告质量的影响，发现多个大股东会降低财务报告质量，且这种效应在分析师关注多、香港交叉上市或有机构大股东的公司中减弱，代理问题是可能机制。
In this paper, we examine the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on financial reporting quality. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms over the period 2007–2018, we find that firms with MLS tend to have lower financial reporting quality. Our findings are robust to an array of robustness tests, including controlling for possible omitted variables, a Heckman two‐step sample selection model, and a difference‐in‐differences analysis based on a propensity score matched sample. We further show that the effect of MLS on financial reporting quality is attenuated for firms followed by more analysts, cross‐listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and held by institutional blockholders. Finally, we find that agency problems appear to be the possible underlying mechanisms through which MLS lower financial reporting quality.