Creditor rights, bank competition, and stability: International evidence
利用15个国家破产法变化，发现更强的债权人权利会加剧银行竞争，进而降低银行稳定性，抵消了通过提高回收率带来的正面效应。
The paper exploits changes in bankruptcy laws in 15 countries to analyze the effect of creditor rights on bank competition and stability. I find that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy increase bank competition, especially in countries with less stringent restrictions on bank entry and non-traditional bank activities. The increase in bank competition lowers bank stability and counteracts other positive effects of stronger creditor rights on bank stability through higher recovery rates. Empirical analysis controls for changes in creditor rights outside bankruptcy and the results are robust to alternative specifications, alternative sample definitions, and omitted variables and endogeneity controls.