Experts in the Boardroom: Director Connections in the Mutual Fund Industry*
研究企业高管担任共同基金董事时形成的董事会关联，发现基金利用这些关联获取信息，其交易能预测高管所在公司的未来盈利和股票收益，表明董事角色超越了正式监督职责。
ABSTRACT This study examines boardroom connections that form when corporate executives sit on mutual fund boards. These connections have the potential to facilitate information flow that informs fund investment decisions. I find that fund trades in the executive's firm anticipate future earnings news and stock returns during the period that the fund and firm are connected. The evidence is consistent with a broad scope of information being transferred through the connections, implying the potential for these connections to have an economically significant impact. For example, trades in the executive's firm predict returns both inside and outside of the earnings announcement period, and trades in stocks in the same sector as the executive's firm also predict returns. This study highlights the potential for the role of fund directors to extend beyond their formal monitoring responsibilities and act as conduits of information.