Blacklisting and the EU as a Global Regulator: The Institutionally Predisposed Norm Breaker
研究了欧盟为何及何时利用市场力量对不合作国家实施黑名单制裁，发现精英推动法治是主因，而利益相关者压力决定时机，黑名单名义上基于国际法却主要针对小国。
Abstract The European Union (EU) is commonly considered to be a regulatory great power that projects external influence based on the power vested in its internal market. Relatively little is known, however, about why and when the EU mobilises its market power to put direct pressure on non‐cooperative countries in regulatory matters. This article examines a critical case of such power projection: the ‘blacklisting’ of third countries. Testing expectations drawn from some of the main theories of EU power, it finds that elite action to promote the rule of law best explains why the EU uses blacklisting, whereas bottom‐up stakeholder pressure explains when this technique is used. A combination of the theories can therefore explain the puzzling pattern of where blacklisting schemes were set up with reference to EU norms and pegged to international law but eventually applied quasi‐exclusively to tiny third countries. These findings call for further research on EU market power.