Strategic investment with positive externalities
研究了连续时间下正外部性变化的战略投资，允许两个相关风险因素，发现企业需要预期先发制人，且第二个风险因素带来额外战略风险，量化了等待成本，并指出先发或后发优势不确定。
We study strategic investment in continuous time with positive externalities of changing magnitude. Our model particularly allows for two correlated risk factors. Constructing subgame-perfect equilibria with pure and mixed strategies, we observe the novel effect that it is important for the firms to anticipate preemption. In fact, the presence of a second risk factor implies also an additional strategic risk. We quantify the associated extra waiting cost and show that it is ex ante uncertain whether investment will happen when there is a first- or a second-mover advantage. Our formal arguments involve several methodological contributions. In addition, we provide detailed specifications of our basic model to address various applications.