Trustee strategies, politicization and de‐delegation: The case of the European Central Bank
本文研究了欧洲中央银行如何在争议中通过双轨制、自愿自我约束和改变衡量标准等策略降低政治化风险，避免事实上的去授权，同时扩大货币政策工具箱。
Abstract This article shows how the European Central Bank (ECB) reduced the risk of politicization and de facto de‐delegation despite experiencing contestation. During the euro area crisis and the coronavirus emergency the ECB's monetary policy measures have been widely praised for their effectiveness. Even though the ECB is an independent trustee that cannot be easily sanctioned, it needs to engage with its principals to receive their political backing for common projects and in order to reaffirm its own centrality in governance. This article identifies different trustee strategies to reduce politicization and thereby to decrease the risk of de facto de‐delegation: (i) dualism , (ii) voluntary self‐restraint , and (iii) changing the yard stick . It concludes by showing that the ECB has expanded its monetary policy toolbox without triggering neither formal nor de facto de‐delegation.