Dating the Lender of Last Resort
利用1847年英格兰银行因黄金储备限制而突然配给信贷这一自然实验，研究发现被拒绝的银行更易倒闭，幸存者随后在恐慌中更频繁但更小规模地求助央行，整体依赖度降低。
Abstract We exploit a fixed rule constraining central bank credit provision in a regression discontinuity framework to analyse counterparties’ behavioural responses to the (non-)receipt of liquidity during a crisis. In spring 1847, the Bank of England suddenly started rationing credit to avoid violating its gold reserve requirement. We show that counterparties that suffered rejection from the Bank were more likely to fail. Conditional on survival, rationed counterparties learned from their experience and changed their behaviour during a subsequent panic in fall 1847: they came to the discount window more often, but submitted smaller requests and relied less on central bank liquidity overall.