Monopsony, wage discrimination, and public policy
研究买方垄断如何导致非基于偏好的工资歧视，分析利润最大化下的雇佣决策，并评估现行法规的经济效应，提出加强禁止工资歧视的政策建议。
Abstract A vast number of empirical studies have found that monopsony power is pervasive in labor markets. In some circumstances, the exercise of monopsony results in wage discrimination that is not taste‐based. Instead, it results from profit maximization in the presence of different labor supply functions of two distinct groups of workers. This paper examines the profit maximizing employment decisions of a monopsonist under these conditions, as well as the public policy regarding wage discrimination. The economic effects of the current statutes are also examined, as well as some policy recommendations to strengthen the prohibition of wage discrimination.