Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination
研究一群质量不确定的代理人竞争奖项时，如何通过社交网络披露证据，导致委托人根据代理人邻居数量进行统计歧视，并刻画了均衡特征。
A group of agents with ex-ante independent and identically uncertain quality compete for a prize, awarded by a principal. Agents may possess evidence about the quality of those they share a social connection with (neighbours), and themselves. In one equilibrium, adversarial disclosure of evidence leads the principal to statistically discriminate between agents based on their number of neighbours (degree). We identify parameter values for which an agent’s ex-ante winning probability is monotone in degree. All equilibria that satisfy some robustness criteria lie between this adverse disclosure equilibrium and a less informative one that features no snitching and no discrimination.