Minimum Cost Consensus Models Measuring Moderator’s Preference on Consensus Levels
研究了群体决策中主持人对共识水平的偏好如何影响共识成本和结果，提出了双边妥协共识框架，并应用于P2P借贷场景。
Group decision making (GDM) is normally resource consuming and requires a moderator to lead a group of experts to achieve consensus. A moderator’s preference on consensus level affects the cost of GDM and has important impacts on the consensus results. However, no previous research has considered the moderator’s preference in consensus. The objective of this article is to analyze the effect of the moderator’s preference on consensus result in GDM. We develop a set of optimization models and propose a bilateral compromise consensus-reaching framework, which provides a flexible way to reach an agreement. We apply the models to a loan consensus problem under a peer-to-peer lending environment. The results show that a moderator with a radical preference on consensus levels presents a lower initial group consensus level and requires more resources than the other two preference types. A moderator with a mixed preference presents the highest initial group consensus level and requires the lowest resources among the three types of preferences.