Rational bubbles and middlemen
研究了资产通过中间商链条交易时理性泡沫的形成机制，发现信息摩擦导致泡沫，且央行公告对风险中性代理人福利无影响，中间商是金融脆弱性的根源。
This paper develops a model of rational bubbles where trade of an asset takes place through a chain of middlemen. We show that there exists a unique and robust equilibrium, and a bubble can occur due to information frictions in bilateral and decentralized markets. Under reasonable assumptions, the equilibrium price is increasing and accelerating during bubbles although the fundamental value is constant over time. Bubbles may be detrimental to the economy, but any announcement from the central bank has no effect on welfare with risk neutral agents. Middlemen are the source of financial fragility.