Zsofia Barany discussion of: Central bank independence
构建了1972-2017年154个国家的法定中央银行独立性动态指数，通过简约式回归分析政治经济因素与央行制度变革的相关性。
The independence of central banks has been considered key in stabilizing inflation, and hence the optimal institutional setup for several decades by academics and policy-makers alike. The current paper analyses the factors that correlate with changes in central bank independence (CBIE). To this end, the author creates a novel extended index of de-jure CBIE for 154 countries between 1972 and 2017. This index allows him to discuss the general and regional trends. Finally, he runs reduced-form regressions inspired by political economy models of central bank reforms to uncover what factors correlate with institutional change in the design of central banks. One of the important contributions of this paper is the construction of a dynamic index of CBIE, which is comparable across countries and over time. The author merges the two most commonly used such indices, which gives rise to four categories: governor and central bank board, monetary policy and conflicts resolution, objectives and limitations on lending to the government. The author also adds two new categories: financial independence, and reporting and disclosure rules. These latter two are especially important dimensions to consider in light of the pressure to broaden the mandates of central banks.