The Ring-Fencing Bonus
研究围栏政策对银行风险的影响，利用英镑回购交易数据发现，受围栏约束的银行集团被认为更安全，融资利率更低，且在市场压力时期更明显。
Abstract We study the impact of ring-fencing on bank riskiness using short-term money markets. Ring-fencing is when the government restricts some banking activities to a subsidiary of the group whilst restricting intra-group transfers. Exploiting confidential data on sterling-denominated repo transactions, we document that banking groups subject to ring-fencing are perceived to be safer—repo investors lend to ring-fenced groups at lower rates—and that the safety perception is amplified during times of market stress. We show that ring-fenced groups also intermediate more cautiously. Our article suggests that structural reforms can create a “safe-haven” bank in the financial system.