When Walras meets Vickrey
研究了准线性效用下资产交换环境，证明当每人最多需求一件且最多拥有一件时，VCG转移等于最大净瓦尔拉斯价格，VCG赤字等于这些价格之和，且赤字非负，说明无占优策略机制能在满足事后个体理性时实现预算盈余。
We consider general asset market environments in which agents with quasilinear payoffs are endowed with objects and have demands for other agents' objects. We show that if all agents have a maximum demand of one object and are endowed with at most one object, the VCG transfer of each agent is equal to the largest net Walrasian price of this agent. Consequently, the VCG deficit is equal to the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices over all agents. Generally, whenever Walrasian prices exist, the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices is a nonnegative lower bound for the deficit, implying that no dominant‐strategy mechanism runs a budget surplus while respecting agents' ex post individual rationality constraints.