Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
研究认知层级（人们战略推理能力的差异）对长期行为的影响，发现尽管短期行为对推理能力敏感，但长期中若存在广义风险占优策略，该策略会独立于玩家能力而出现。
Humans differ in their strategic reasoning abilities and in beliefs about others' strategic reasoning abilities. Studying such cognitive hierarchies has produced new insights regarding equilibrium analysis in economics. This paper investigates the effect of cognitive hierarchies on long run behavior. Despite short run behavior being highly sensitive to variation in strategic reasoning abilities, this variation is not replicated in the long run. In particular, when generalized risk dominant strategy profiles exist, they emerge in the long run independently of the strategic reasoning abilities of players. These abilities may be arbitrarily low or high, heterogeneous across players, and evolving over time.