Inefficient Water Pricing and Incentives for Conservation
通过孟加拉国的两个随机实验，研究发现农民只有在面对边际水价时才会采用节水技术并减少用水，但仅提供边际定价选项不足以促使他们主动投资节水。
Farmers often buy water using fixed fees—rather than with marginal prices. We use two randomized controlled trials in Bangladesh to study the relationship between marginal prices, adoption of a water-saving technology, and water usage. Our first experiment shows that the technology only saves water when farmers face marginal prices. Our second experiment finds that an encouragement to voluntarily convert to hourly pumping charges does not save water. Taken together, efforts to conserve water work best when farmers face marginal prices, but simply giving an option for marginal pricing is insufficient to trigger water-saving investments and reduce irrigation demands.