Regulation Fair Disclosure and the timeliness of long‐horizon management forecasts
研究了公平披露规则（Reg FD）如何影响管理层对年度盈利的长期预测的及时性，特别是坏消息预测，发现该规则促使坏消息预测更及时发布，减少了与好消息预测的及时性不对称。
Abstract We examine the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter Reg FD) on the timeliness of long‐horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, especially those conveying bad news. We expect that managers are less timely in issuing bad news forecasts than good news forecasts prior to Reg FD when they can disclose bad news to selected analysts and institutional investors privately. As Reg FD prohibits private disclosures of material information, managers are expected to accelerate the issuance of long‐horizon bad news forecasts after Reg FD due to concerns of litigation risk from institutional investors and loss of analyst coverage, leading to a decrease in timeliness asymmetry between bad news and good news forecasts. We also expect that the effect of Reg FD is stronger among firms with lower ex‐ante litigation risk or higher information asymmetry as they are more likely to withhold bad news prior to Reg FD. In addition, we expect that investors and analysts react more to bad news forecasts than to good news forecasts prior to Reg FD, and this asymmetry decreases after Reg FD. Our results are consistent with our predictions and suggest that managers provide long‐horizon forecasts conveying bad news more timely after Reg FD.