Strategic effects of stock pollution: the positive theory of fiscal deficits revisited
本文构建了一个整合气候政策的动态政治经济学模型，研究公共债务与存量污染的策略互动。核心发现是，无论政治家的环境偏好如何，留给未来政府大量污染都不是最优选择，这导致首期策略性减排；同时，当考虑存量污染时，连任不确定性下的策略性赤字支出可能不再无效率，甚至可能提高福利。
Abstract This article introduces a dynamic political-economy model of public debt which integrates climate policy. Strategic incentives are shaped by both an emission interaction and a budget interaction if public good provision contributes to a stock of persistent pollution. In a bipartisan system, politicians, who disagree on the optimal internalization of pollution, compete for office. The central finding is that bequeathing a large stock of pollution to the future government is not optimal for any incumbent regardless of their environmental preferences. This leads to strategic emission abatement in the first period. Additionally, while the incumbent engages in strategic deficit spending when reelection is uncertain, this effect is no longer necessarily inefficient when accounting for stock pollution. Both effects may increase welfare as a direct result of reelection uncertainty.