Do related party transactions affect family firm valuations?
研究家族企业中关联交易的发生概率及其对估值的影响，发现创始人领导的家族企业更易发生关联交易，且此类交易会降低企业估值溢价，但2006年SEC报告法规的变更减少了损害价值的关联交易并保护了少数股东。
Abstract We examine the likelihood and value relevance of related party transactions in family firms. Based on an extensive hand‐collected sample, we find that founder‐led family firms are more likely to enter into related party transactions than other firms. We also find that the founder‐led family firm valuation premium is reduced when these firms disclose related party transactions, especially opportunistic related party transactions. We also examine the significant change in related party transaction reporting regulations enacted in 2006 and find that it led to a decline in the number of value‐decreasing related party transactions for founder‐led family firms. We find a corresponding decrease in the detrimental effect of related party transactions on founder‐led family firms’ valuation. Our results suggest that changes in the 2006 SEC related party transaction reporting regulations better protected minority shareholders from wealth extraction via related party transactions in founder‐led family firms.